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Recent advances in the fields of machine learning and neurofinance have yielded new exciting
research perspectives in practical inference of behavioural economy in financial markets and mi-
crostructure study. We here present the latest results from a recently published stock market
simulator built around a multi-agent system architecture, in which each agent is an autonomous
investor trading stocks by reinforcement learning (RL) via a centralised double-auction limit order
book. The RL framework allows for the implementation of specific behavioural and cognitive traits
known to trader psychology, and thus to study the impact of these traits on the whole stock market
at the mesoscale. More precisely, we narrowed our agent design to three such psychological biases
known to have a direct correspondence with RL theory, namely delay discounting, greed, and fear.
We compared ensuing simulated data to real stock market data over the past decade or so, and find
that market stability benefits from larger populations of agents prone to delay discounting and most
astonishingly, to greed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Past challenges: Understanding how markets behave
has been one of the central questions in financial market
economics. Traditionally, market dynamics are studied
as phenomena in themselves with a top-down approach
to complexity inference, for example by using statistical
or econometric models [1]. Yet trading in real financial
markets comes as a result of the collective interactions
of human actors, either directly in the form of economic
traders, or indirectly in the form of investors’ imperatives
that constrain algorithmic trading strategies [2]. The gap
between these two approaches can potentially be bridged
using a new generation of multi-agent systems (MAS),
or agent-based models (ABM), which have been sought
after by industry practitioners and regulators alike [22].
Modern MAS applied to financial markets have been able
to reenact the so-called market stylised facts [3], which
are basic aspects of the market microstructure. Neuro-
finance studies examined cognitive biases in individual
financial decision making [4]. Yet no study to our knowl-
edge has revealed the global impact of individual cogni-
tive traits/biases in large economic agent populations on
the quantifiable financial market dynamics [5].
New prospects: The pertinence of such studies is in-
creased by the fact that the fundamental and structural
causes to the 2008 financial crisis have not been fully
eliminated, and are just as potent and impactful to fi-
nancial markets as they were a decade ago [23]. Yet, re-
cent trends give ABM research in economics a whole new
potential range of realism, coming from the association
of two present-day major scientific breakthroughs: i- the
steady advances of cognitive neuroscience and neuroe-
conomics [4, 6], and ii- the progress of machine learning
due to the increasing computational power and use of big
data methods [7]. Even more promising is the synergy
of these two fields, with the emergence of machine learn-
ing algorithms incorporating decision-theoretic features
from neuroeconomics [8, 9], or neuroscience models ap-
proached from the angle of machine learning [10, 11]. We
have designed such a MAS stock market simulator [12],
where the agents are endowed with realistic learning dy-
namics (each agent perform reinforcement learning in or-
der to forecast stock prices and manage its portfolio) and
identified cognitive biases and social interactions. We
here extend such a platform to investigate what specific
roles the cognitive biases play in emergent collective mar-
ket dynamics.
Methodology : Such a MAS simulator emulates the
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microstructure of a financial stock market through a
bottom-up approach to system complexity, via economic
agents (e.g. investors, institutions) and their economic
transactions (e.g. buying, selling, holding stocks). Each
individual agent is modelled according to three distinct
features: i- a reinforcement learning algorithm to develop
its own skills for price forecasting and stock trading (i.e.
each agent learns to trade over time), ii- such an agent
learning process framed for a rather chartist or funda-
mentalist approach to stock price valuation, iii- imple-
mentation of behavioural and cognitive biases relevant
to trader psychology, as the framework of reinforcement
learning is known to have multiple parallels with deci-
sion processes in the brain [11], and computationally of-
fers the possibility to functionally embed decision the-
ory features to model specific neuroeconomic biases. At
each time step of the simulation, the agents individually
learn to either buy, sell or hold stocks, in a given num-
ber and at a given price. To do this, they each send the
transaction orders to an order book that is common to
all agents and which sorts and matches the transaction
orders received. The agents learn the outcome (or re-
ward) of their economic investments over time. The law
of supply and demand, and other key phenomena to price
formation [13, 14] such as illiquidity and bid-ask spread
are thus reenacted. The simulated price and volume time
series of each stock are compared to real financial data.
The MAS parameters can be calibrated so that its out-
put matches real stock markets, thereby measuring the
collective role played by the cognitive traits of the agents
in a quantitative way, as described in Section IV.
II. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Overview : We here briefly review the basics of RL
theory that pertain to this study, and how these have
a rich correspondence with neuroscience research. To-
gether with supervised and unsupervised learning, RL
has been termed one of the three paradigm shifts of ma-
chine learning, and is today at the forefront of almost all
breakthroughs in AI research. Like many other machine
learning methods, RL has its roots in behavioural psy-
chology and decision theory. In RL, we consider an agent
in a given environment that must learn the best way to
consistently receive a preset reward from its environment
through its possible actions. The whole RL problem and
solution is thus how the agent matches these actions in
a dynamic environment so as to maximise this reward.
In the beginning of the task, the agent is completely ag-
nostic as to which actions are best to use: it will have to
learn this on its own.
Parameters: The RL problem is defined with three
main parameters: the states of the environment s ∈ S,
the agents actions a ∈ A, and the agent reward r ∈ R.
The states and actions can be defined as more or less
complex concepts, and notice the rewards can be positive
or negative. The goal of RL for the agent is to find its
policy pi(s, a) = Pr(a|s) so as to maximise its rewards.
In order to do this, two major types of RL algorithms
are used: i- model-based methods rely on the agent es-
timating two functions called the transition probability
Pass′ = Pr{st+1 = s′|st = s, at = a} and the expected
value Rass′ = E[rt+1|st = s, at = a, st+1 = s′], where
0 < γ < 1 is a discount parameter related to the concept
of delayed reward, and out of these derive the so-called
state-value function: V (s) = E[
∑∞
k=0 γ
krt+k+1|st = s].
ii- Model-free methods rely more simply on the esti-
mation of the so-called action-value function Q(s, a) =
E[
∑∞
k=0 γ
krt+k+1|st = s, at = a]. These functions V (s)
and Q(s, a) in model-based and model-free methods thus
allow the agent to update its policy, which in turn shall
be used at the next time step of the task to select a rele-
vant action a, and iteratively proceed in a same manner.
Features: Three major features appear here, and are
at the centre of all RL research: i- curse of dimensional-
ity arises from the number of state-action pairs. If these
are two numerous, the problem of convergence to a pol-
icy may be intractable. ii- Temporal credit assignment
is another issue pertaining to how rewards are practi-
cally defined for the task at hand, and how temporal
discounting of these rewards is set. iii- Exploration vs.
exploitation is the last issue, which pertains to whether
it is profitable to the agent to exploit the rewards linked
to a good policy it found in its environment, or whether
it is better to continue exploring and (perhaps) attain to
a better policy and hence rewards.
III. MODEL
Features: We have designed such a MAS stock market
simulator, and published the main aspects of its perfor-
mance and calibration process to real stock market data
in a previous work [12], to which we refer the reader
for more details, as we will simply here recall the gen-
eral frame of its architecture. This MAS simulator com-
prises three novel features: i- each agent learns to forecast
and trade autonomously by reinforcement learning with a
long-only equity strategy, ii- the agent discretionary asset
pricing process relies on learning to weight both chartist
and fundamentalist inputs, iii- the agents reinforcement
learning framework is embedded with specific cognitive
and behavioural traits proper to trader psychology, which
for the sake of simplicity and robustness we constrained
to three: delay discounting, fear, and greed. The latter
features allow us to study the weight and impact of cer-
tain agent psychological traits on stock markets at the
mesoscale, by comparing our simulated data with real
stock market data, coming from the London Stock Ex-
change over the years 2007 to 2018.
Architecture: Let’s first briefly outline the general pro-
file of this MAS stock market simulator, which gener-
ally deals with a set of two C++ classes: i- a number I
of agents which try and maximise over time the net as-
set value of their individual portfolio, which consists in
risk-free assets (bonds) and a number of stocks (equity),
and ii- a number J of different double-auction limit or-
der books, each corresponding to the transactions of a
stock j ∈ J at each time step of the simulation. At the
beginning of the simulation, each agent is completely ag-
nostic wrt. both price forecasting and trading. It will
autonomously learn these by two distinct reinforcement
learning algorithms, and send at at each time step t of
the simulation a transaction order to the order book con-
cerning a specific number of each stock j to buy or sell,
or will simply hold its position and wait for a better time
to trade. At each time step, each order book thus collects
the transaction orders of all agents and processes them
by sorting the bid orders in a descending way, and the
ask orders in an ascending way, matching them for trans-
actions at mid-price at each level, starting from the top,
until bids no longer exceed offers. That latest transac-
tion at the lowest possible level is then the market price
of stock j at next time step P j(t+1), the total number of
stocks transacted is its traded volume at next time step
V j(t+1), and the absolute difference between the average
of all bids and asks is its spread Sj(t + 1). The market
price at time t = 0 is set by default at P (t = 0) = £100,
but for their own asset pricing, agents approximate by
cointegration [15] another time series T j(t) generated at
time t = 0, which corresponds to the fundamental prices
of asset j, as in other models [16, 17]. The inspiration
for the profile of such data is a metric often encountered
in corporate finance called enterprise value [18], which
is the theoretical price at which the company issuing the
stocks would be acquired, and which can give a rough
fundamental stock price estimate, if divided by the to-
tal number of stocks outstanding. The weight given to
this fundamentalist valuation or to the market price is
learned by each agent, so that some agents will tend to
be more chartists or fundamentalists. Agents trade as
such for a learning phase of 1000 time steps, after which
all their portfolio assets are reset to their initial values,
and the simulation then let to run for statistical infer-
ence and microstructure study. Past this learning phase,
we consider a simulation of T time steps, where one time
step typically represents a trading day, and thus Tw = 5,
Tm = 21, Ty = 286 correspond to a trading week, month,
and year, respectively.
Agents: We here give more details on the agents
design, which are initialised with specific parameters.
These execute at each time step t, and for each stock j, a
reinforcement learning algorithm F i to do price forecast-
ing, and another one to learn trading T i based on the
result of F i.
i- Parameters: With its number of initial stocks, cash
reserves, and proper psychological traits of behaviour
and cognition (see below), each agent is initialised at
time t = 0 with specific parameters such as: an invest-
ment horizon τ i ∼ U{Tw, 6Tm} (corresponding to the
number of time steps after which the agent liquidates
its position), a memory interval hi ∼ U{Tw, T} (corre-
sponding to the size of the rolling time interval used by
the agent for its learning process), a transaction gesture
gi ∼ U(0.2, 0.8) (scaling with the spread and related to
how far above or below the value of its own stock pric-
ing the agent is willing to trade and deal a transaction),
or a reflexivity amplitude parameter ρi ∼ U(0, 100%)
(gauging the weight given by the agent to fundamental
or chartist valuation of the stock).
ii- Forecasting : The reinforcement learning states of
the forecasting algorithm F i are: a longer-term price
volatility sF0 (0 for low, 1 for mid, 2 for high), a shorter-
term price volatility sF1 (0 for low, 1 for mid, 2 for high),
and the gap between its own present fundamental valu-
ation and the present market price sF2 (0 for low, 1 for
mid, 2 for high). Out of these states, the agent chooses
an action in order to optimise its price prediction at its
investment horizon τ i: the type of econometric forecast
aF0 (0 for mean-reverting, 1 for averaging, 2 for trend-
following), the size of the historical lag interval for this
econometric forecast aF1 (0 for short, 1 for mid, 2 for
large), and the weight given to its reflexivity amplitude
parameter ρi for price estimation aF2 (0 for low, 1 for mid,
2 for large). The rewards of these performed actions are
defined via the mismatches between past forecasts at time
t−τ i and their eventual price realisation at time t. These
feed a direct policy update with new action probabilities
for the agent in such a state.
iii- Trading : The reinforcement learning states of the
forecasting algorithm T i are: the trend of the price fore-
cast of the previous algorithm sT0 (0 for decreasing, 1
for stable, 2 for increasing), the price volatility sT1 (0 for
low, 1 for mid, 2 for high), the level of the agent risk-free
assets compared to its initial values sT2 (0 for low, 1 for
high), the level of the agent stock holdings compared to
its initial values sT3 (0 for low, 1 for high), and the stock
liquidity based on previous exchanged volumes sT4 (0 for
zero, 1 for low, 2 for high). From this state, the agent can
chose the following actions: sending an order to the or-
der book aT0 (0 for shorting, 1 for holding, 2 for longing),
and at what price above or below the agent’s own price
estimate aT1 (0 for indifference to lose on transaction, 1
for neutral, 2 for willingness to gain on transaction) via
the transaction gesture gi scaled with the market spread
Sj(t). The rewards of these performed actions are de-
fined via the difference in cashflow at time t between the
profit or loss consequent to the agent’s past action at
time t− τ i, and the one had this action not been taken.
Again, these feed a direct policy update with new action
probabilities for the agent in such a state.
IV. AGENT PSYCHOLOGY
Considerations: We now want to gauge the impact of
trader psychology on stock markets. Today, the propor-
tion of trading in financial stock markets that is of algo-
rithmic origin is above 80% in terms of transaction cash-
flows on major exchanges [19]. One could hence rightly
think about the relevance of such a study, at a time when
these are increasingly subject to algorithmic trading and
automated portfolio management (passive asset manage-
ment, exchange-traded funds, robo-advisors, etc.). Nev-
ertheless, the large impact played by behavioural eco-
nomics and trader psychology on stock markets still re-
mains, for the following reason: the performance con-
straints (risk, return, liquidity, etc.) placed on these
algorithms are (and will always be) of human origin.
For example, the relevance of time-discounting is seen
in practical deadlines assigned by investors to portfolio
managers to assess asset management performance. Or
we can say the same about fear and greed via the use
of common thresholds for Sharpe ratio metrics [20], and
the choice of investors to be more or less risk-averse for
certain expected returns. Such indirect impact of hu-
man cognition and behaviour on increasingly automated
stock markets is even seen in the ever-larger role played
by entire classes of trading strategies, like high-frequency
trading, to which portfolio managers have progressively
turned because of the preference of many investors for
smoother equity curves and minimal drawdowns.
Traits: The framework of RL has a direct correspon-
dence with decision theory, and hence several traits of
learning, cognition, and behaviour can be easily imple-
mented through it [8, 9]. For example, belief revision
(which is defined as changing one’s belief insufficiently in
the face of new evidence) is straightforwardly modelled
by the reinforcement learning rate. But in this Paper, we
have for the sake of simplicity and robustness restricted
our attention to three specific psychological traits, which
allow us to model certain interesting and relevant issues
proper to behavioural economic and investor behaviour
in financial markets:
i- Delay discounting : This is defined as having greater
economic utility on shorter time-scales than longer
ones [21]. It is modelled by the agent being initialised
with a much lower investment horizon τ i, now drawn
from a discrete uniform distribution U [Tw, 2Tw(. Note
that delay discounting may be regarded as a trait of ad-
dictive behaviour.
ii- Fear : This is modelled by the second reinforcement
algorithm T i taking the action aT0 = 0 (to send a sell or-
der to the order book) if either sT1 = 2 (high volatility),
sT2 = 0 (low risk-free assets), or s
T
4 = 0 (illiquid stock),
regardless of the price direction shown by sT0 . This is per-
formed once every n = 5 time steps on average, according
to a uniform distribution. Notice this is congruent with
the long-only equity strategy of all agents.
iii- Greed : This is modelled by the second reinforce-
ment algorithm T i taking the action aT0 = 2 (to send
a buy order to the order book) only if sT0 = 2 (trend
of the price is to increase according to the forecast F i)
regardless of other state indicators such as volatility or
illiquidity. This is done once every n = 5 time steps on
average, according to a uniform distribution. Notice this
is also congruent with the long-only equity strategy of all
agents.
These traits can be implemented in a chosen percent-
age of the agents population, and one can observe and
study the ensuing changes in mesoscale impact on the
market by varying these percentages. As in our previous
work [12], we compare these results to real stock market
data, which comes from 640 stocks, that have been con-
tinuously traded on the London Stock Exchange over the
years 2007 to 2018.
V. RESULTS
A. Delay discounting
We first want to study the market impact of larger
percentages of agents set with delay discounting. The
interest of such a study can be linked with the role played
by higher frequency trading in present stock exchanges:
for when increasingly more agents trade more frequently
or at shorter time scales, one could ask for instance if this
is beneficiary or not to market stability. For simulations
with increasing percentages of agents having such a delay
discounting profile as described in the previous section,
we observe the following:
– We see on Fig. 1 a strong decrease in absolute
logarithmic price returns.
– We see on Fig. 2 a steady decrease in short-term
price volatility, and increase in long-term volatility.
– We see on Fig. 3 a very strong increase in trading
volumes, as expected.
– We see on Fig. 4 a steady decrease in market bid-
ask spread.
– We see on Fig. 5 a greater propensity for longer
bull and bear market regimes.
– We see on Fig. 6 a reversion effect by which
greater propensity for best performing agents to
have a large transaction gesture gi, and conversely
for worst performing agents to have a smaller trans-
action gesture.
– The rates of agent bankruptcy remain stable re-
gardless of these varying percentages.
Increasing numbers of such delay discounting agents
are thus posited to be beneficial to stock market stabil-
ity, by lowering general volatility and increasing trading
volumes, and thus tackling the issue of market illiquidity
propitious to crashes.
B. Fear
We then want to study the market impact of larger per-
centages of agents set with fear as a psychological trait.
Fear and greed have both been described as the main
FIG. 1: Means of all absolute logarithmic price returns,
for real data, and simulations with a percentage p of agents
corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the
total agent population with a delay discounting profile (the
remainder 100 − p being bias-free agents). The simulations
are generated with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875
(corresponding to about 11 years), and S = 20.
FIG. 2: Means of all volatilities (defined as standard devia-
tions of price normalised to price itself σ/P (t)) computed over
lags of one weeks (black), one month (red), and six months
(blue) intervals, for simulations with a percentage p of agents
corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the
total agent population with a delay discounting profile (the
remainder 100 − p being bias-free agents). The simulations
are generated with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875
(corresponding to about 11 years), and S = 20.
forces behind stock market dynamics, and especially in
specific market regimes, such as bubbles or crashes, the
propensity of investors to fear or even panic has a large
game theoretic impact on stock market dynamics and sta-
bility. For larger percentages of agents with such a fear
profile as described in the previous section, we observe
the following:
– We see on Fig. 7 a sharp increase in stock market
crashes, as expected.
– We see on Fig. 8 a steady increase in market bid-
ask spread.
We shall also add that trading volumes slowly increase,
and that the proportion of bankrupt agents remains sta-
FIG. 3: Means of all trading volumes, for a percentage p of
agents corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%
of the total agent population with a delay discounting profile
(the remainder 100 − p being bias-free agents). The simula-
tions are generated with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875
(corresponding to about 11 years), and S = 20.
FIG. 4: Means of all bid-ask spread in percent of
price, for a percentage p of agents corresponding to p =
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the total agent population
with a delay discounting profile (the remainder 100− p being
bias-free agents). The simulations are generated with param-
eters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to about 11
years), and S = 20.
ble with larger populations of agents with such a fear
profile.
C. Greed
We finally want to study the impact of investor greed,
as we studied fear, and assess its mesoscale influence on
stock market stability. For larger percentages of agents
with such a greed profile as described in the previous
section, we observe the following:
– We see on Fig. 9 and 10 a decrease in logarithmic
returns.
– We see on Fig. 11 a steady decrease in price volatil-
ities at all time scales.
FIG. 5: Distribution of the number of consecutive days of ris-
ing prices (positive values) and dropping prices (negative val-
ues). This is for both real (dashed black curve) and simulated
(continuous curves) data, the latter being for a percentage p
of agents corresponding to p = 0% (red), p = 20% (yellow),
p = 40% (green), p = 60% (brown), p = 80% (light blue), and
p = 100% (dark green) of the total agent population with a
delay discounting profile (the remainder 100 − p being bias-
free agents). The simulations are generated with parameters
I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to about 11 years),
and S = 20.
FIG. 6: Means of individual agents gesture gi among 10%
best (blue) and 10% worst (red) performing agents at time
t = T , for simulations with a percentage p of agents cor-
responding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the to-
tal agent population with a delay discounting profile (the re-
mainder 100− p being bias-free agents). The simulations are
generated with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corre-
sponding to about 11 years), and S = 20.
– We see on Fig. 12 a slow increase in trading vol-
umes.
– We see on Fig. 13 a very sharp diminution of mar-
ket crashes.
– We see on Fig. 14 a strong decrease in market bid-
ask spread.
– We see on Fig. 15 a greater likelihood for bull mar-
ket regimes.
– The rates of agent bankruptcy strongly decrease
with these varying percentages, being almost
FIG. 7: Number of market crashes (defined as a drop of
more than 20% in market price), for a percentage p of agents
corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the
total agent population with a fear profile (the remainder 100−
p being bias-free agents). The simulations are generated with
parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to
about 11 years), and S = 20.
FIG. 8: Distribution of bid-ask spread in percent of price,
for a percentage p of agents corresponding to p = 0% (black),
p = 20% (red), p = 40% (yellow), p = 60% (green), p = 80%
(brown), and p = 100% (light blue) of the total agent popu-
lation with a fear profile (the remainder 100 − p being bias-
free agents). The simulations are generated with parameters
I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to about 11 years),
and S = 20.
halved beyond p > 80%.
We can thus come to the somewhat counter-intuitive
conclusion that larger populations of greedy agents
sharply increase market stability.
FIG. 9: Distribution of logarithmic returns of prices
log[P (t)/P (t− 1)] of real (dashed black curve) and simulated
(continuous curves) data. The simulations are for a percent-
age p of agents corresponding to p = 0% (red), p = 20%
(yellow), p = 40% (green), p = 60% (brown), p = 80% (light
blue), and p = 100% (dark green) of the total agent popula-
tion with a greed profile (the remainder 100 − p being bias-
free agents). The simulations are generated with parameters
I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to about 11 years),
and S = 20.
FIG. 10: Means of all absolute logarithmic price returns,
for real data and simulations with a percentage p of agents
corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the
total agent population with a greed profile (the remainder
100−p being bias-free agents). The simulations are generated
with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to
about 11 years), and S = 20.
FIG. 11: Means of all volatilities (defined as standard devia-
tions of price normalised to price itself σ/P (t)) computed over
lags of one weeks (black), one month (red), and six months
(blue) intervals, for simulations with a percentage p of agents
corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the
total agent population with a greed profile (the remainder
100−p being bias-free agents). The simulations are generated
with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to
about 11 years), and S = 20.
FIG. 12: Means of all trading volumes, for a percentage p of
agents corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of
the total agent population with a greed profile (the remainder
100−p being bias-free agents). The simulations are generated
with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to
about 11 years), and S = 20.
FIG. 13: Number of market crashes (defined as a drop of
more than 20% in market price), for a percentage p of agents
corresponding to p = 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the
total agent population with a greed profile (the remainder
100−p being bias-free agents). The simulations are generated
with parameters I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to
about 11 years), and S = 20.
FIG. 14: Means of all bid-ask spread in percent of
price, for a percentage p of agents corresponding to p =
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of the total agent population
with a greed profile (the remainder 100 − p being bias-free
agents). The simulations are generated with parameters
I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to about 11 years),
and S = 20.
FIG. 15: Distribution of the number of consecutive days
of rising prices (positive values) and dropping prices (nega-
tive values). This is for both real (dashed black curve) and
simulated (continuous curves) data, the latter being for a per-
centage p of agents corresponding to p = 0% (red), p = 20%
(yellow), p = 40% (green), p = 60% (brown), p = 80% (light
blue), and p = 100% (dark green) of the total agent popula-
tion with a greed profile (the remainder 100 − p being bias-
free agents). The simulations are generated with parameters
I = 500, J = 1, T = 2875 (corresponding to about 11 years),
and S = 20.
VI. CONCLUSION
We thus modelled a stock market via a multi-agent
system, where the agents autonomously perform portfo-
lio management via long-only equity strategies, based on
autonomous reinforcement learning algorithms perform-
ing price forecasting and stock trading, with a chartist
or fundamentalist approach to price estimation. In such
a model, each agent is also endowed with specific and
relevant psychological traits proper to behavioural eco-
nomics, that can be naturally implemented via the agent
reinforcement learning framework. These allow us to
study the impact of agent learning on financial stock mar-
kets at the mesoscale, as we narrowed our study to three
such psychological traits: delay discounting, fear, and
greed. Through comparison of such simulated data, we
found that market stability greatly benefits from larger
numbers of such delay discounting agents. We also ob-
serve that market stability especially benefits from in-
creasing (resp. decreasing) proportions of greedy (resp.
fearful) agents. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the rates of
agent bankruptcy strongly decrease with larger percent-
ages of greedy agents, while remaining stable for larger
population of agents with a fear or delay discounting
profile. Future extension of this work would naturally
be to study other psychological biases, but also to as-
sess bubble regimes in stock markets. One could also
extend the framework of agent trading so as to encom-
pass other trading strategies and portfolio diversification
to explore cross-asset structures. We expect these results
to be of interest to financial regulatory instances as well
as academia.
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